

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

NORFOLK, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL ACTION
22-00117

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

KAREN READ

**MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS**

On June 9, 2022, a Norfolk County grand jury indicted defendant Karen Read on charges of murder in the second degree (Indictment 1), manslaughter while operating under the influence of alcohol (Indictment 2), and leaving the scene of personal injury and death (Indictment 3) following the death of her boyfriend, John O'Keefe, on January 29, 2022. Trial on the matter began in April 2024. There were eight weeks of evidence and nearly five days of deliberations. After the jurors expressed to the Court that they were deadlocked for a third time, the Court declared a mistrial.

The defendant now moves to dismiss the charges for murder in the second degree and leaving the scene of personal injury and death arguing that retrial would violate the double jeopardy protections of the federal and state constitutions because the jury, in fact, reached a unanimous decision to acquit the defendant on those charges. Alternatively, the defendant argues that dismissal is required because there was no manifest necessity to support the declaration of the mistrial with respect to those charges. After careful consideration, this Court concludes that because the defendant was not acquitted of any charges and defense counsel consented to the Court's declaration of a mistrial, double jeopardy is not implicated by retrial of the defendant. The motion is therefore **DENIED**.

BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2024, the jury began its deliberations in the defendant's trial. In addition to the three indictments, the Court had instructed the jury to consider two lesser included offenses to manslaughter while operating under the influence of alcohol – involuntary manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide (OUI liquor and negligence).

On Friday, June 28, 2024, at approximately 12:10 p.m., the jury foreperson sent a note to the Court. It stated: "I am writing to inform you on behalf of the jury that despite our exhaustive review of the evidence and our diligent consideration of all disputed evidence, we have been unable to reach a unanimous verdict." The Court requested argument from the Commonwealth and the defendant as to whether there had been due and thorough deliberation from the jury. Assistant District Attorney Lally, on behalf of the Commonwealth, argued that the jury had not had sufficient time to deliberate and that therefore, it was far too early in the deliberative process to give the jury the *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction.¹ He also pointed out that although the note indicated that the jury had not yet come to a conclusion, it did not indicate that doing so was not possible. Attorney Yannetti, on behalf of the defendant, "disagree[d] with Mr. Lally's characterization of the note." He argued:

"The word exhaustive is the word that I think is operative here. [The jury is] communicating to the court that they've exhausted all manner of compromise, all manner of persuasion and they're at an impasse. You know, this is a case where they jury has the legal instructions. They've only really asked one question, which was to try and get a report they were not allowed to get, and I think the message has been received that the evidence is closed and they won't get anything more. They've been essentially working nonstop

¹ The use of the *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction is a matter of discretion of the trial judge. *Commonwealth v. Parreira*, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 316 (2008). It is the "orthodox approach to dealing with a deadlocked jury" see *Commonwealth v. Firmin*, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 64 (2016) (citation omitted), and "designed to urge the jury to reach a verdict by giving more serious consideration to opposing points of view." *Commonwealth v. Semedo*, 456 Mass. 1, 20 (2010).

over the last three, four days. We're approaching a weekend. They didn't come back with this at three o'clock or four o'clock. They're at twelve o'clock and they have nowhere to turn. So our position is the jury should be read the *Tuey-Rodriguez* model instructions and go from there."

The Court ruled that given the length of the trial, the number of exhibits and witnesses, the complexity of the issues, and that the jury had only been deliberating for three days, deliberations had not been sufficiently due and thorough to warrant a *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction. It instructed the jury to continue deliberating.

On Monday, July 1, 2024, at approximately 10:45 a.m., the jury sent another note to this Court. This note stated:

"Despite our commitment to the duty entrusted in us, we find ourselves deeply divided by fundamental differences in our opinions and state of mind. The divergence in our views are not rooted in a lack of understanding or effort but deeply held convictions that each of us carry, ultimately leading to a point where consensus is unattainable. We recognize the weight of this admission, and the implications it holds."

The Court again requested argument from counsel as to whether there had been due and thorough deliberations. The Commonwealth argued that the jury had been deliberating twenty-two to twenty-three hours but given the length of trial, number of exhibits and witnesses, and complexity of issues, they had not done a thorough deliberation up to this point. Attorney Yannetti, again, had a vastly different view. He argued:

"Our view is that it is time for a *Tuey-Rodriguez* [instruction]. They have come back twice indicating essentially that they're hopelessly deadlocked but the content of this latest message is that they have been over all the evidence. The previous message said they did an exhaustive review. This time they said that . . . they have fundamental disagreements about what the evidence means. It's a matter of opinion. It's not a matter of lack of understanding. This court when you sent the jury out encouraged them not to take a straw vote, encouraged them to go over all the evidence in a very

methodical manner. I think all indications are that they have done that. This is what *Tuey-Rodriguez* is for.”

The Court agreed that the jury had engaged in due and thorough deliberations, noting that this jury had been “extraordinary” and it had never seen a note like this from a jury. It thereafter provided the jury of the full *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction and asked them to return to the deliberations with those instructions in mind.²

That same day, at approximately 2:30 p.m., the jury sent another note to the Court. The Court stated to counsel that the jury was at an impasse. After the jurors filed into the courtroom, the Court read the note:

“Despite our rigorous efforts we continue to find ourselves at an impasse. Our perspectives on the evidence are starkly divided. Some members of the jury firmly believe that the evidence surpasses the burden of proof establishing the elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, others find the evidence fails to meet this standard and does not sufficiently establish the necessary elements of the charges. The deep division is not due to lack of effort or diligence, but rather a sincere adherence to our individual principles and moral convictions. To continue to deliberate would

² The *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction states: “Our Constitution and laws provide that in a criminal case, the principal method for deciding questions of fact is the verdict of a jury. In most cases and perhaps strictly speaking in all cases absolute certainty cannot be obtained nor is it expected. The verdict to which each juror agrees must of course be his or her own verdict, the result of his or her own convictions, and not merely an acquiescence in the conclusions of other jurors. Still, in order to bring twelve minds to a unanimous result, you must examine the issues you have to decide with candor and with the proper regard and respect for each other’s opinions. You should consider that it is desirable that this case be decided. You have been selected in the same manner and from the same source as any future jury would be selected. There is no reason to suppose that this case will ever be submitted to twelve persons who are more intelligent, more impartial, or more competent to decide it than you are or that more or clearer evidence will be produced at another trial. With all this in mind it is your duty to decide this case if you can do so conscientiously. In order to make a decision more attainable, the law always imposes the burden of proof on the Commonwealth to establish every essential element of each indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are left with a reasonable doubt as to any essential element of any indictment, then the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and must be found ‘not guilty’ on that indictment. In conferring together, you are to give proper respect to each other’s opinions, and listen with an open mind to each other’s arguments. Where there is disagreement, those jurors who would find the defendant ‘not guilty’ should consider whether the doubt in their minds is a reasonable one if it makes no impression on the minds of the other jurors who are equally intelligent, who have heard the same evidence with the same attention, who have an equal desire to arrive at the truth and who have taken the same oath as jurors. At the same time, those jurors who would find the defendant ‘guilty’ ought seriously to ask themselves whether they may not reasonably doubt the correctness of their judgment if it is not shared by other members of the jury. They should ask themselves whether they should distrust the weight or sufficiency of the evidence if it has failed to convince the minds of their fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.”

be futile and only serve to force us to compromise these deeply held beliefs.”

After reading this note, the Court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury back to the deliberation room to wait for the judge. Counsel remained in the courtroom to discuss an agreeable date to return for a status conference.

On July 8, 2024, the defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss supported by affidavits from Attorney Yannetti and co-counsel, Attorney Jackson. Attorney Jackson’s affidavit stated that on July 2, 2024, a juror in the case (“Juror A”) contacted him. Attorney Jackson was able to identify the person as a deliberating juror based on his/her description of who he/she is, where he/she was seated, and certain identifying information (name and occupation) disclosed during the voir dire process. According to Attorney Jackson’s affidavit, Juror A told him that he/she wished to inform him of the true results of the deliberations because he/she believed those results significantly impact the defendant’s rights. Juror A said the jury unanimously agreed that the defendant was not guilty of Counts 1 and 3 and specifically that the murder charge was “off the table.” First Jackson Affidavit at par. 5.

In his affidavit, Attorney Jackson also stated: “Neither Ms. Read nor her counsel consented to the entry of the mistrial. Defense counsel was denied the opportunity to request that the Court inquire on which count or counts the jury may have been deadlocked (including lesser included offenses), and on which count or counts the jury may have arrived at a verdict.” *Id.* at pars. 9 and 10.

Attorney Yannetti’s affidavit averred that on July 3, 2024, he received communications from two “informants” who had received information from two deliberating jurors in the case. The first informant (“Informant B”) sent him a screenshot he/she had received from someone else (“Intermediary B”) of text messages that Intermediary B had purportedly received from a

juror (“Juror B”). Attorney Yannetti averred that he was able to positively identify which juror was Juror B based on a first name given to him from Informant B. In the screenshot, Juror B texted Intermediary B, “It was not guilty on second degree. And split in half for the second charge. When the judge sent us back with that Hernandez thing to look at the other side it turned into a bully match. I thought the prosecution didn’t prove the case. No one thought she hit him on purpose or even thought she hit him on purpose. . . .” Yannetti Affidavit at par. 4.

Attorney Yannetti stated that another informant (“Informant C”) contacted him on July 3, 2024. Informant C told him he or she personally knows a juror (“Juror C”) and that Informant C and Juror C have a mutual friend (“Intermediary C”) who is a current coworker and friend of Juror C. Intermediary C told Informant C via text message that Juror C was a deliberating juror in the case. Intermediary C had a discussion over text message with Juror C about the experience of being a juror. Intermediary C said that Juror C said there was “no consideration for murder 2. Manslaughter started polling at 6/6 then ended deadlocked [at] 4no8yes. . .”

Yannetti Affidavit at par. 10. Informant C texted back, “interesting. If there was no consideration for murder two, shouldn’t she have been acquitted on that count[] and hung on the remaining chargers [sic] goes back to the jury verdict slip that was confusing.”³ *Id.*

Intermediary C texted, “she should’ve been acquitted I agree. Yes, the remaining charges were what they were hung on. And that instruction paper was very confusing.” *Id.*

Attorney Yannetti stated that based on the description of Juror C he received from Informant C and the description of what Juror C told Intermediary C, he could positively identify that Juror C was a deliberating juror.

³ As noted below, defense counsel argued to the Court that the verdict slip for Indictment 2, which allowed the foreperson to check “guilty” for the lesser included offenses, would be confusing for the jury if they decided the defendant was not guilty of all the lesser included offenses.

Attorney Yannetti later filed a supplemental affidavit in support of the defendant's motion to dismiss wherein he stated that he received an unsolicited phone call from an individual identifying himself/herself as Juror B. Juror B told Attorney Yannetti that he/she was familiar with the affidavit he had previously filed and confirmed the substance of the conversation between Informant B and Intermediary B. Juror B clarified that he/she meant to write, "No one thought she hit him on purpose or even knew that she had hit him." Yannetti Supplemental Affidavit at par. 4.

On July 10, 2024, Attorney Jackson submitted a supplemental affidavit stating that on July 8, 2024, another juror ("Juror D") contacted him. He identified this person as a juror by the description of who he/she is, where he/she was seated, and certain identifying information (name and occupation) disclosed during the voir dire process. Juror D told Attorney Jackson that "he/she was 'uncomfortable' with how the trial ended. . . . Juror D said that it was very troubling that the entire case ended without the jury being asked about each count, especially Count 1 and Count 3." Jackson Supplemental Affidavit at pars. 3-4. According to Jackson's Supplemental Affidavit, Juror D told him that the jury agreed that the defendant was not guilty on Counts 1 and 3, that they disagreed solely on Count 2's lesser offenses, but that they believed that they were compelled to come to a resolution on all counts before they could or should report verdicts on any counts. Juror D believed all jurors would corroborate his/her account. He/she also stated that if necessary, he/she would testify before the court as long as his/her identity remained protected.

On July 18, 2024, Attorney Jackson submitted a second supplemental affidavit stating that on July 17, 2024, he was contacted by another juror ("Juror E") who he identified by the description of who he/she is, where he/she was seated, and certain identifying information (name

and occupation) disclosed during the voir dire process. Juror E also stated that the jury was unanimous on Counts 1 and 3, that the defendant was not guilty of those charges, and that they were deadlocked on one of the “lower charges” on Count 2. Jackson Second Supplemental Affidavit at par. 5.

On August 1, 2024, the Commonwealth filed a Post-Trial Notice of Disclosure stating that ADA Lally had received two unsolicited voicemails from an individual identifying themselves as a deliberating juror stating that the jury had been unanimous on Counts 1 and 3. The Commonwealth also received emails from three individuals identifying themselves as jurors stating that they wished to speak anonymously. In its response to the emails, the Commonwealth stated that it was ethically prohibited from inquiring as to the substance of the jury deliberations, and that it could not promise confidentiality as it may be required to disclose the substance of any conversation to the defendant or the Court. All three jurors declined to communicate further with the Commonwealth.

DISCUSSION

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Massachusetts common and statutory law protect an individual defendant from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same crime. *Perrier v. Commonwealth*, 489 Mass. 28, 31 (2022). See *Commonwealth v. Taylor*, 486 Mass. 469, 483 (2020), quoting *Oregon v. Kennedy*, 456 U.S. 667, 671–672 (1982) (“[T]he [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause affords a criminal defendant a ‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal’” [citation omitted]). A defendant is entitled to protection from double jeopardy “if there had been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy,” see *Commonwealth v. Hebb*, 477 Mass. 409, 413 (2017), or if a mistrial is

entered “without the defendant’s request or consent . . . unless there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial” (quotation and citations omitted). *Taylor*, 486 Mass. at 483. See *Hebb*, 477 Mass. at 413, quoting *Yeager v. United States*, 557 U.S. 110, 118 (2009) (“The ‘interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws’ justifies treating the jury’s inability to reach a verdict as a nonevent that does not bar retrial.”).

In her motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that retrial on Indictments 1 and 3 would violate the double jeopardy protections of the federal and state constitutions because, despite absence of a jury verdict, the jury, in fact, reached a unanimous decision to acquit her on those charges, or alternatively, because there was no manifest necessity to support the declaration of the mistrial with respect to the charges. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the defendant’s arguments are without merit.

I. Acquittal of the Defendant

The defendant first contends that she was acquitted on Indictments 1 and 3, and that therefore retrial is barred based on her attorneys’ affidavits purporting to reflect statements by jurors that the jury reached a unanimous conclusion that she was not guilty on those charges. Although all the statements in the affidavits are from purported jurors who wish to remain anonymous, for the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the statements as true and accurate.⁴ Even doing so, any agreement among the jurors as to Counts 1 and 3 cannot be considered acquittals for purposes of double jeopardy.

To trigger double jeopardy protection, “[a]n acquittal requires a verdict on the facts and merits” (citations and quotations omitted). *Commonwealth v. Brown*, 470 Mass. 595, 603

⁴ While the Court accepts the averments as true and accurate, it disagrees with defense counsel’s characterization of the statements as “strong and uncontradicted.” The substance of the conversations directly contradicts the notes the jury wrote to the Court during deliberations, the last of which expresses disagreement over whether the Commonwealth met its burden as to the “elements of the *charges*.” (Emphasis added).

(2015). See G. L. c. 263, § 7 (“A person shall not be held to answer on a second indictment or complaint for a crime of which he has been acquitted upon the facts and merits . . .”). And, “the only verdict which can be received and regarded, as a complete and valid verdict of a jury . . . , is an open and public verdict . . . affirmed in open court, as the unanimous act of the jury, and in presence of the whole panel, so that each juror has an opportunity to express his dissent to the court, in case his decision has been mistaken or misrepresented by the foreman or his fellows, or in case he has been forced into acquiescence by improper means” (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Zekirias, 443 Mass. 27, 33 (2004). See Mass. R. Crim. P. 27(a) (“The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be a general verdict returned by the jury to the judge in open court. The jury shall file a verdict slip with the clerk upon the return of the verdict.”). As such, “the weight of final adjudication” cannot “be given to any jury action that is not returned in a final verdict” and a distinction must be made “between agreement on a verdict, and return, receipt, and recording of a verdict” (citations omitted). *A Juvenile v. Commonwealth*, 392 Mass. 52, 56–57 (1984).

Because there was no open and public verdict affirmed in open court rendered in this case, the defendant was not acquitted of any of the charges. The only unanimous act of the jury here was their representation to the Court that they were “at an impasse” and unable to agree on whether the Commonwealth had established beyond a reasonable doubt the “elements of the charges.” The purported later attestations by some jurors, after they had been dismissed, that the jury had in fact agreed on some of the charges during deliberations do not have the “force of a final verdict.” *Commonwealth v. Floyd P.*, 415 Mass. 826, 831 (1993). See *A Juvenile*, 392 Mass. at 57 (after mistrial was declared due to deadlock, judge did not err in refusing to accept signed verdict slips recovered from deliberation room showing “not guilty” because “[i]t is not

enough to show that the jury may have agreed on some issues at some time; if that limited showing were to control, uncertainties would be invited”); see also *Blueford v. Arkansas*, 566 U.S. 599, 606 (2012) (double jeopardy did not bar retrial after hung jury where foreperson reported unanimous vote on offense before deliberations had concluded but deadlock at conclusion).

The defendant argues that it is elevating form over substance to not accept that the statements in the affidavits reflect an acquittal of the defendants on Counts 1 and 3. However, the rendering of a verdict in open court is not a “ministerial act” as the defendant contends. Rather, it communicates the finality of the deliberations, and its pronouncement in open court ensures its unanimity. See *A Juvenile*, 392 Mass. at 57 (“Public affirmation in open court provides safeguards against mistakes.”). Indeed, the authority upon which the defendant relies places particular importance upon the jury’s pronouncement of its findings in open court. See *Blueford*, 566 U.S. at 613 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the forewoman’s *announcement in open court* that the jury was ‘unanimous against’ conviction on capital and first-degree murder . . . was an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes”).⁵ Thus, a “verdict in substance” is a “final collective decision . . . reached after full deliberation, consideration, and compromise among the individual jurors . . . And when that decision [is] *announced in open court*, it [becomes] entitled to full double jeopardy protection” (emphasis added). *Id.* at 616, citing *Commonwealth v. Roth*, 437 Mass. 777, 796 (2002) (“declining to give effect to ‘the verdict received from the lips of the foreman in open court’ would ‘elevate form over

⁵ In written and oral argument, the defendant also relies on language from *Taylor*, 486 Mass. at 482. *Taylor* discussed whether a judicial determination to terminate proceeding based on a procedural ground implicated double jeopardy. The Supreme Judicial Court explained, “What constitutes an ‘acquittal’ is not to be controlled by the form of the judge’s action,” and that the determination does not depend on “checkmarks on a form.” *Id.* This language in *Taylor* does not inform the Court as to the circumstances here.

substance”). Where there was no verdict announced in open court here, retrial of the defendant does not violate the principle of double jeopardy.

II. Manifest Necessity of Mistrial

The defendant’s motion to dismiss also argues that double jeopardy bars re-prosecution because she did not consent to a mistrial and there was no manifest necessity to declare one. This argument, too, is without merit.

“A defendant’s consent to a mistrial removes any double jeopardy bar to retrial” (quotation and citation omitted). *Pellegrine v. Commonwealth*, 446 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2006). Consent may be explicit or implicit. Explicit consent may occur by either moving for a mistrial or agreeing to one. *Commonwealth v. Edwards*, 491 Mass. 1, 13 (2022). Consent to a mistrial may be implied “where a defendant had the opportunity to object [to a declaration of a mistrial] and failed to do so.” *Pellegrine*, 446 Mass. at 1005. See *United States v. McIntosh*, 380 F.3d 548, 554 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Where the defendant sits silently by and does not object to the declaration of a mistrial even though he has a fair opportunity to do so, a court may presume his consent” [quotation and citation omitted]). See also *United States v. You*, 382 F.3d 958, 964-965 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1076 (2005) (“a court may infer consent only where the circumstances positively indicate a defendant’s willingness to acquiesce in the mistrial order” [quotations and citations omitted]); *United States v. Goldstein*, 479 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Consent [to a mistrial] need not be express, but may be implied from the totality of the circumstances attendant on a declaration of a mistrial.”).

As noted, the Court here declared a mistrial after the jury reported three times that they were deadlocked. After the second time, the Court determined that the jury had engaged in due and thorough deliberations and gave the *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction before sending the jury to

deliberate further. Massachusetts General Laws c. 234A, § 68C, provides that if “a jury, after due and thorough deliberation, returns to court without having agreed on a verdict, the court may state anew the evidence or any part of the evidence, explain to them anew the law applicable to the case and send them out for further deliberation; *but if they return a second time without having agreed on a verdict, they shall not be sent out again without their own consent*, unless they ask from the court some further explanation of the law” (emphasis added). See *Commonwealth v. Jenkins*, 416 Mass. 736, 737 (1994) (“If, after due and thorough deliberation, the jury twice advise the judge that they are unable to reach a verdict, the judge may not properly send the jury out again without their consent, unless the jury ask for some further explanation of the law.”). In their note to the Court, the jury specifically stated, “[t]o continue to deliberate would be futile and only serve to force us to compromise these deeply held beliefs,” making it clear that they would not consent to continuing their deliberations.

Attorney Yannetti *twice* argued for the Court to give the *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction—the final step before the Court would declare a mistrial. See *Jenkins*, 416 Mass. at 737; see also *Ray v. Commonwealth*, 463 Mass. 1, 4 (2012) (counsel’s request for *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction “permit[ed] the inference that both parties were provided an opportunity to be heard on possible alternatives to a mistrial”). Specifically, on Friday, June 28, 2024, after three days of deliberations, when the jury sent their first note indicating that they had engaged in an “exhaustive review of the evidence” and “ha[d] been unable to reach a unanimous verdict,” Attorney Yannetti argued that the jury had engaged in due and thorough deliberations, was at an impasse, and should be given the *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction. The following Monday, when the jury sent a second note after deliberating for approximately two hours, stating that “consensus was unattainable,” Attorney Yannetti again argued that due and thorough deliberations had

occurred and described the jury as “hopelessly deadlocked.” Defense counsel, in arguing twice that due and thorough deliberations had occurred and pushing for the instruction, presumably was aware of the legal implications if the jury returned deadlocked again. Nevertheless, in a remarkable turnaround, defense counsel now argues that the result they twice advocated for was “sudden” and “unexpected.” See Defendant Karen Read’s Motion to Dismiss at 8.

Although the Court did not specifically ask defense counsel if they had any objection to the declaration of a mistrial, counsel had multiple opportunities to voice an objection if they in fact had one. While waiting for the jury to enter the courtroom after the Court announced the jury was again at an impasse on the afternoon of July 1, 2024, defense counsel could have asked to be heard on the issue. During the subsequent discussion about scheduling a status hearing right after the Court declared a mistrial, counsel had yet another opportunity to inform the Court of its dissatisfaction. Lastly, counsel could have communicated to the Court any objection or request to poll the jurors while the jury was still at the courthouse waiting in the deliberation room after the declaration of the mistrial. Instead, defense counsel said nothing to the Court about the mistrial and then proceeded to the courthouse steps where Attorney Jackson declared to the media and onlookers that the “[Commonwealth] failed miserably and will continue to fail” with its prosecution of the defendant.⁶

It strains credulity to believe that if defense counsel wanted to voice any objection to the Court, it would not have been heard. Significantly, defense counsel were no shrinking violets. Neither Attorney Jackson nor Attorney Yannetti has ever needed this Court to inquire whether counsel had an objection in order to be heard, and the Court has never denied counsel the opportunity to be heard in open court or at sidebar. The Court reconvened many times at

⁶ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrsJPBRVqDg>

counsel's request. Just days before the declaration of mistrial, defense counsel asked to address the Court while the jury was deliberating to raise an objection about the verdict slip. Attorney Jackson was not shy in informing the Court that he wanted to "make [his] argument" and that the Court's decision about the verdict slip was "not how it should be and it's over our strong objection."⁷ Attorney Jackson went so far as to suggest that "it was almost like the Court is directing a verdict of the subordinate charges" by not making changes he wanted. The Court finds it hard to believe that when counsel heard that the jury was at an impasse for a third time and a mistrial was inevitable, at perhaps the most crucial point in the trial, counsel would sit silently if they did not consent to a mistrial.

As such, the Court does not credit Attorney Jackson's averment that he lacked an opportunity to be heard. Defense counsel's silence despite ample opportunity to be heard is deemed consent. See *Pellegrine*, 446 Mass. at 1005 (when trial judge on own initiative declared mistrial, defendant's silence was deemed consent where there was ample time to object despite not being directly asked by judge). Cf. *Commonwealth v. Phetsaya*, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 298 (1996) (silence was not consent where judge's conduct was "so intimidating to defense counsel . . . as to foreclose any objection from defense counsel to the declaration of a mistrial").

Even assuming *arguendo* that the defendant here did not consent to the mistrial, the law is clear that a retrial is permissible so long as there was manifest necessity for the mistrial. *Taylor*, 486 Mass. at 483. "The trial judge's belief that the jury is unable to reach a verdict has long been considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial" (quotation and citation omitted). *Ray*, 463 Mass. at 3. See *Oregon*, 456 U.S. at 672 (describing "hung jury" as "prototypical example" of manifest necessity). Because the Court here had no doubt based on the jury's notes

⁷ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjPsNvnLXV0>

to the Court that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict and the jury represented to the Court that continued deliberations would be futile, there was manifest necessity for the mistrial based on the deadlock.

As stated above, the foreperson, on behalf of the jury in this case, sent the Court three notes, none of which indicated agreement on any of the charges. In the first note, the jury wrote that they had been “unable to reach a unanimous verdict.” In the second note, they stated that they were “deeply divided by fundamental differences in our opinions and state of mind” and that “consensus is unattainable.” In their third and final note, after they had been given the *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction, the jury stated that they continued to be “at an impasse.” They described themselves as “starkly divided” on their “perspectives on the evidence” explaining:

“Some members of the jury firmly believe that the evidence surpasses the burden of proof establishing the elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, others find the evidence fails to meet this standard and does not sufficiently establish the necessary elements of the charges. The deep division is not due to lack of effort or diligence, but rather a sincere adherence to our individual principles and moral convictions. To continue to deliberate would be futile and only serve to force us to compromise these deeply held beliefs.”

The only reasonable interpretation of these notes, and specifically the final note, was that the jury could not agree on any of the three charges and further deliberations would serve no purpose.⁸

For the defense to now claim that the notes were susceptible to different interpretations such that the Court should have inquired further rings hollow, particularly where Attorney Yannetti had twice argued that the jury had engaged in due and thorough deliberations and could not agree. See *United States v. Keene*, 287 F.3d 229, 234 (1st Cir. 2002) (no abuse of discretion

⁸ Given the care that went into writing the notes and how articulately they expressed the jurors’ disagreement, it strikes this Court as odd that there was no inkling of an indication of agreement in the content of the notes or that if the jurors were uncertain whether they could return a partial verdict, they would not have asked the Court.

in declaring a mistrial given “the increasingly adamant manner in which the jurors announced that they were deadlocked”). Moreover, defense counsel’s conduct immediately after the declaration of the mistrial in no way suggests that they thought otherwise.

The defendant contends that the Court failed to carefully consider that as an alternative to a mistrial, it could have “simply ask[ed] the jury to specify the charge(s) on which it was deadlocked.” Defendant Karen Read’s Motion to Dismiss at 8. However, “[t]he question whether a mistrial is appropriate in the circumstances of a given case is not answered by application of a ‘mechanical formula.’” *Ray*, 463 Mass. at 4, quoting *Illinois v. Somerville*, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973). See *Commonwealth v. Bryant*, 447 Mass. 494, 503 (2006) (decision whether to declare a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge). Rather, the Court considers several facts such as the statements in a jury’s note concerning their inability to reach an agreement, the time spent in deliberations, and the length and complexity of the trial. *Ray*, 463 Mass. at 4-5. See *Renico v. Lett*, 559 U.S. 766, 775 (2010) (“we have never required a trial judge, before declaring a mistrial based on jury deadlock, to force the jury to deliberate for a minimum period of time, to question the jurors individually, to consult with (or obtain the consent of) either the prosecutor or defense counsel, to issue a supplemental jury instruction, or to consider any other means of breaking the impasse”).

Where here, the jury had been deliberating five days, had returned to the Court three times stating they could not agree, had been given the *Tuey-Rodriguez* instruction and returned hours later with a note plainly indicating that they could not agree as to the “elements of the charges” and that “to continue to deliberate would be futile,” asking the jury on which charges they were deadlocked was not necessary to determine that there was manifest necessity for a mistrial. See *Fuentes v. Commonwealth*, 448 Mass. 1017, 1018–1019 (2007) (where final note

from the foreperson unequivocally stated that the jury were “unable to come to a unanimous decision,” judge was not required to inquire whether there was any reasonable probability of unanimous verdicts or if the jury would consent to further deliberations); *Ray*, 463 Mass. at 6 n.5 (judge did not err in declining to poll jury on whether further instructions or deliberation would be likely to resolve the deadlock).

Moreover, the defendant’s argument ignores the fact that one of the three charges had lesser included offenses. Therefore, if upon questioning, the jury had indicated to the Court that they were not deadlocked on all the charges, the only option would have been for the Court to send the jury back for further deliberations. See *A Juvenile*, 392 Mass. at 56 (judge should not inquire as to partial verdicts on lesser included offenses). Such action would be improperly coercive under the circumstances. It has been repeatedly recognized that deadlocked juries are particularly susceptible to coercion. *Roth*, 437 Mass. at 791. “Where the jurors have twice reported themselves deadlocked, and have already heard the *Tuey-Rodriguez* charge, a judge’s inquiry concerning partial verdicts cannot avoid communicating to the jury the judge’s desire to salvage *something* from the trial.” *Id.* at 792 (emphasis in original). Where here the jury had before it one indictment which included lesser included offenses, had three times reported themselves deadlocked on separate charges, had already heard the *Tuey-Rodriguez* charge, and had sent a final note indicating that continued deliberations would only “serve to force [them] to compromise [their] deeply held beliefs,” sending them to deliberate further would have been improperly coercive.⁹

⁹ It is the Court’s view that under these circumstances, even posing the question to the jury of whether they actually were deadlocked would have implied to the jurors that the Court wanted them to resume deliberations to reach a verdict. Given that Attorney Jackson had already expressed concern that the Court was “directing a verdict of the subordinate charges,” the Court was extremely cautious to not give any appearance of partiality. See *United States v. Hotz*, 620 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting that a court must avoid putting pressure on the jury).

The defendant's argument suggests that questioning or polling jurors who report a deadlock is best practice or at least commonly done by trial judges. However, the defendant has not cited any cases saying as much and indeed, such an inquiry is not undertaken in the regular course.¹⁰ For a judge to make such an inquiry on her own accord could impede upon the strategic decision of counsel to not make such a request. The defendant's argument is based on hindsight. No one other than the jury knew that questioning the jurors as to their deadlock would have yielded a favorable outcome for the defendant. It is likely for that reason, defense counsel consented to this Court's declaration of a mistrial.

III. Post-Trial Inquiry

The defendant alternatively requests that the Court allow counsel to conduct a post-trial inquiry of the jurors to "substantiate the existence of an acquittal." Defendant Karen Read's Motion to Dismiss at 9. Such an inquiry is impermissible.

The defendant's argument relies solely on *Commonwealth v. McCalop*, 485 Mass. 790 (2020). In *McCalop*, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court should have allowed the defendant's motion for jurors' names and contact information based on the post-trial statement of a deliberating juror regarding racist statements made during deliberations. *Id.* at 791. The Supreme Judicial Court explained, "[t]he presence of even one juror who is not impartial violated a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury." *Id.* at 798, quoting *Commonwealth v. McCowen*, 458 Mass. 461, 494 (2010). Recognizing that "[r]acial bias in the jury system is 'a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the

¹⁰ The defendant relies on *Commonwealth v. Foster*, 411 Mass. 762 (1992) and *Commonwealth v. LaFontaine*, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 529 (1992) to argue that there would be nothing coercive about asking a jury reporting a deadlock whether they had reached a unanimous verdict on any of the counts. Because neither the jury in *Foster* nor the jury in *LaFontaine* reported being deadlock in its deliberations, and none of the offenses charged had lesser included offenses, there was clearly no risk of coercion in the courts seeking partial verdicts on the separate indictments in those case. The circumstances here are markedly different.

administration of justice,” the *McCalop* court held that the defendant should have been given a “fair opportunity to obtain an affidavit from that juror setting forth with some specificity who among the jurors made statements reflecting racial bias . . . and the statements that were made.”

McCalop, 485 Mass. at 799, quoting *Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado*, 580 U.S. 206, 224 (2017).

The defendant’s argument here does not implicate racial bias or her right to receive an impartial trial. Thus, the reasoning the Court employed in *McCalop* does not extend to this case. See *Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto*, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (declining to extend racial bias exception to inquiry of jury unanimity because “infection of the criminal justice system with racial or ethnic bias is a unique type of constitutional deprivation that requires a vigilant response not warranted in the circumstances presented here”).

The defendant’s request effectively seeks permission from the Court to inquire from deliberating jurors that which is impermissible—information regarding the substance of the jury’s deliberations. “The secrecy of jury deliberations has served as a bedrock of our judicial system, and inquiry into the ‘jury’s deliberative processes . . . would intrude improperly into the jury’s function” (quotation and citation omitted). *Commonwealth v. Moore*, 474 Mass. 541, 548 (2016). It is simply not the case, given the content of the jury’s final note to the Court, that any inquiry to jurors now could be limited solely to the results of the deliberative process and not implicate the process itself. Any inquiry would necessarily require the Court to understand why the jury’s final note communicated a deadlock on the charges when post-trial, certain deliberating jurors are purportedly stating that the jury was, in fact, unanimous on most of the charges. While the defendant contends that the conflict is reflective of the fact that the instructions given to the jury by the Court were confusing, determining whether this is true would necessarily require inquiry into the back and forth among the jurors during deliberations.

See *DiBenedetto*, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 686 (“The judge is precluded from inquiring into the internal decision making process of the jury as a whole or of the individual juror being questioned . . . Accordingly, evidence that jurors misunderstood the instructions of the presiding judge . . . cannot be considered” [internal quotations and citations omitted]). Thus, such an inquiry is prohibited.


The defense counsel has not cited one case suggesting the post-trial inquiry they now seek is appropriate or that it could change the outcome of the proceedings.¹¹ For the reasons already discussed, an acquittal of the defendant now on Indictments 1 and 3 based on conclusions purportedly reached during the jury’s deliberations is not possible. Therefore, there is no reason for the Court to allow post-trial inquiry of the jurors. See *A Juvenile*, 392 Mass. at 57 (no error in denial of motion to subpoena the foreman where process would only serve to impeach jury’s report to the judge in open court).

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

This Court recognizes that the bar on retrials following acquittals is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” *Taylor*, 486 Mass. at 481, quoting *United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.*, 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). However, where there was no acquittal on any of the charges in the defendant’s first trial, there is no risk of subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy by retrial on all the charges.

Therefore, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is **DENIED**.

Date: August 22, 2024


Beverly J. Cannone
Justice of the Superior Court

¹¹ Cases that defense counsel referred to at the hearing on this motion concerning post-trial inquiry of jurors where juror bias or outside influence was at issue are readily distinguishable from the circumstances here.